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Abstract 
Two studies examined the moderating effects of right wing authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation on the relationship between terrorist images (soldiers vs. criminals) and 
preference for counterterrorist actions (military aggression vs. criminal prosecution). Study 1 
indicated that the perception of Al-Qaeda terrorists as soldiers was related to preference for 
military counterterrorism, especially among people high in social dominance orientation. The 
relationship between the perception of Al-Qaeda terrorists as criminals and preference for the 
criminal prosecution of terrorists was strengthened among those high in right wing 
authoritarianism. Study 2 showed that when terrorists were framed as soldiers, social 
dominance orientation was related to support for military counterterrorism. When terrorists 
were framed as criminals, only people who endorsed high levels of right wing 
authoritarianism supported criminal prosecution of terrorists. Social dominance orientation 
was related to opposition towards military counterterrorism when terrorists were not 
perceived as soldiers or framed as criminals. It was also related to opposition towards criminal 
prosecution of terrorists when terrorists were framed as criminals. The findings suggest that 
different terrorist images are related to preference for counterterrorism that corresponds with 
the content of the images and individuals’ chronic ideological orientations.  
 
 
Key words: Terrorist Images, Counterterrorism, Right Wing Authoritarianism, Social 
Dominance Orientation 
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The question of the most effective and appropriate approach towards counterterrorism 
is brought to public awareness with every major terrorist attack. Which counterterrorist 
policies are finally preferred seems to be shaped largely by two factors: the framing of the 
image of terrorists by the media and politicians (e.g. Norris, Kern & Just, 2003) and the 
dominating ideological ‘climate’ (e.g. the emphasis on conservative vs. liberal political 
values, e.g. Farer, 2008). Recent psychological analyses indicate that different perceptions of 
terrorists and terrorism are associated with different understandings of the goals of 
counterterrorism and preferences for different counterterrorist actions (e.g. Kruglanski, 
Crenshaw, Post &Victoroff, 2007). In particular, framing terrorists’ images as either soldiers 
or criminals, and terrorism as either an act of war or a crime, is likely to have different 
consequences for the chosen approach to counterterrorism and subsequent intergroup relations 
(McCauley, 2007). We argue that, in addition, different terrorist images will appeal to people 
who differ with respect to their ideological orientations such as right wing authoritarianism 
(RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO).  
Social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and right 
wing authoritarianism (e.g. Altemeyer, 1996) are underlined by distinct worldviews and 
values (Duckitt, 2006; see also Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005b). They are 
related to different perceptions of the nature of the social world. They predispose people to 
focus on different aspects of terrorist threat. As a result, people high in social dominance 
orientation and people who endorse high levels of right wing authoritarianism are likely to 
form different understandings of terrorists and their goals. They are also likely to prefer 
different forms of counterterrorism (military vs. police and criminal justice system actions) 
especially when they chronically perceive or are prompted to perceive terrorists as enemy 
soldiers or criminals. We test these propositions in two studies conducted in two European 
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countries. Before we outline our hypotheses in more detail, we discuss the role of terrorist 
images and ideological orientations in shaping responses to terrorist threat.  
 
Terrorist images and approaches to counterterrorism  
Most authors see terrorism as a rational strategy for attaining organizational goals (e.g. 
political autonomy, political power; e.g. Crenshaw,1998; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006; F. 
Moghadam, 2005). However, bias in and irrational aspect of terrorist thinking are also 
emphasized (Spirznak, 2001). Importantly, it has been suggested that individual and group-
based reactions to terrorist threat may be shaped by the way the image of terrorists is framed 
and perceived (Kruglanski et al., 2007; McCauley, 2007; Pronin, Kennedy & Butsch, 2006).  
Kruglanski et al. (2007) propose that counterterrorism, understood as a search for a 
cure for the indoctrinated, will follow the perception of terrorism as a disease and the image 
of terrorists as victims of an ugly and severe illness. Terrorism seen as a strategy of action in 
an escalated intergroup conflict will motivate the search for the most adequate and rational 
conflict resolution strategy. Counterterrorism seen as an in-group’s fight with a dangerous 
enemy should be related to understanding terrorist attacks as an act of war and the image of 
terrorists as enemy soldiers. Finally, the image of terrorists as criminals is likely to relate to 
efforts to capture and prosecute individual perpetrators of the unlawful acts in order to punish 
and isolate them. Empirical studies supported some of these propositions. For example, 
Pronin et al. (2006) demonstrated that portraying terrorists as irrational fanatics elicited 
preference for unilateral aggression as a way of dealing with terrorism. However, when 
terrorists were portrayed as rational strategists in conflict, diplomatic ways and negotiations 
were considered as possible counterterrorist responses. 
McCauley (2007) argues that, most typically, terrorist attacks are framed by the media 
and politicians as acts of war or a crime. Importantly, these frames are likely to elicit different 
5 
 
emotional responses from the public and encourage different approaches towards 
counterterrorism. When terrorism is framed as a strategy of warfare, it is likely that terrorists 
will be seen as enemy warriors. They will be seen as homogenous and interchangeable 
representatives of an out-group that threatens the well-being, if not the very existence of, the 
in-group. The members of the in-group are likely to be perceived as similarly interchangeable 
actors motivated by the single purpose of defending the in-group. Framing terrorism as a 
crime does not mobilize the group-based response. Terrorists are likely to be seen as 
individual criminals. A proper way of dealing with them is through the efforts of the police 
and the actions of a criminal justice system.  
The different assumptions about who the terrorist actors are (a group vs. an individual) 
elicit different propositions concerning the most adequate counterterrorist measures. 
Retaliation and coercion against the whole out-group are adequate responses to terrorist 
soldiers waging war against the in-group. The efforts of the police and the system of justice to 
capture, prosecute and punish are appropriate responses to the individual terrorist criminals. 
These actions differ in target (groups vs. individuals) and scope (short-term mobilization of 
resources to fight the war until it is won vs. long-term internal strategies and international 
cooperation, building knowledge bases of the criminal contexts and activities). Framing 
terrorism as an act of war requires a group-level response. It elicits actions that are likely to 
intensify intergroup tensions and escalate the intergroup conflict. Framing terrorism as a 
crime results in more precise targeting of those against whom the counterterrorist actions are 
directed. The lawful punishment of individual terrorists is less likely than military aggression 
to radicalize the so-far-halfhearted supporters of the terrorist cause. Mobilization of the group-
based response and escalation of the intergroup conflict is what the terrorist organizations 
usually hope for. Aggressive counterterrorism is likely to grant the terrorists the public 
support they need to survive and thrive (McCauley, 2006). 
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In the present paper we attempt to verify empirically some of these theoretical 
propositions. More specifically, we aim to examine whether there is a relationship between 
the image of terrorists as soldiers vs. criminals and preference for military counterterrorism 
vs. the criminal prosecution of terrorists. Importantly, we propose that these relationships may 
not be as straightforward as initially suggested. They are likely to be moderated by individual 
ideological orientations related to different assumptions about the nature of the social world 
and intergroup relations.  
 
Ideological orientations, terrorist images and approaches to counterterrorism  
We propose that people may prefer certain approaches to counterterrorism because the 
terrorist images to which these approaches correspond fit their basic worldviews and meet 
their psychological needs. In addition, people with different ideological orientations may draw 
different conclusions from the same terrorist images. Especially, people high in social 
dominance orientation and people high in right wing authoritarianism may find different 
terrorist images convincing. Consequently, they may prefer different counterterrorist actions 
when these images are salient. 
Empirical studies confirm that right wing authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation, although positively related, are associated with different worldviews and place 
importance on different aspects of social relationships (Cohrs et al., 2005b; Duriez, Van Hiel 
& Kossowska, 2005; Pratto et al., 1994; Roccato & Ricolfi, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; 
Whitley, 1999). Social dominance orientation is a desire for hierarchical social order. People 
high in this orientation strive to belong to dominant groups, suffer if they do not and support 
beliefs that legitimize and maintain existing social inequalities (Jost & Thompson, 2000; 
Pratto et al., 1994). Right wing authoritarianism is a convergence of (1) submissiveness to the 
established social authorities; (2) adherence to the social conventions endorsed by society at 
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large and the social authorities, and (3) aggressiveness towards those who endanger social 
conventions and/or those indicated by the established authorities (Altemeyer, 1996). Both 
variables reliably predict prejudice (e.g. van Hiel & Marvielde, 2002) and aggressiveness in 
intergroup relations (e.g. Altemeyer, 1996; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). However, they predict 
different kinds of prejudice (Cohrs et al., 2005b; Duriez & van Hiel, 2002; Duckitt, 2006; 
Kreindler, 2005) and their intergroup effects are independent (Duckitt et al., 2002; McFarland, 
2005), being additive, rather than interactive (Sibley, Robertson & Wilson, 2006).  
In other words, people who endorse high levels of right wing authoritarianism and 
people high in social dominance orientation are hostile for different reasons and often towards 
different groups. Importantly, right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation 
develop from different motivational goals and are associated with different worldviews 
(Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Duckitt & Sibley, 2006; Duckitt, et al., 2002). They 
are related to different emotions (e.g. Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2006; Kossowska, Bukowski & 
van Hiel, 2008); personality traits (e.g. Ekehammar, et al., 2004; Heaven & Bucci, 2001), and 
values (Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005c; Duriez & van Hiel, 2002; Rohan & 
Zanna, 1996).  
More specifically, authoritarian goals pertain to control and security in a world seen as 
a dangerous place. People who endorse high levels of right wing authoritarianism are 
concerned with group cohesion, social order and stability that maintain group security and the 
predictability of the social environment (e.g. Duckitt, et al., 2002, 2006). Authoritarian 
punitiveness and aggression is directed towards those who threaten an in-group, its authorities 
and the epistemic security they provide (e.g. Kruglanski et al., 2006). People high in right 
wing authoritarianism are aggressive when they think it is necessary to defend the in-group 
and when they think such behavior is moral (justified by the authorities) (e.g. Kreindler, 
2005). People high in social dominance orientation are motivated by goals of dominance, 
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superiority and power. They view the social world as a competitive jungle and intergroup 
relations as a struggle for dominance. Their hostility is directed towards groups that arouse 
their competitiveness over status or power (e.g. Duckitt, et al., 2002; Duckitt, 2006). People 
high in social dominance orientation fight to win because otherwise they will lose. They 
attempt to dominate through fear of being dominated themselves. 
 
The goals of the present studies 
In the present studies we test the hypothesis that different terrorist images (criminals 
vs. enemy soldiers) will be related to preference for different approaches towards 
counterterrorism. More specifically, we assume that chronic perceptions of terrorists as 
criminals will be related to preference for criminal prosecution of terrorists but not military 
counterterrorism. On the other hand, a tendency to believe that terrorists are enemy soldiers 
will be related to preference for military counterterrorism but not for criminal prosecution of 
terrorists. We expect that these relationships will be especially pronounced among people 
high in right wing authoritarianism or people high in social dominance orientation, 
respectively. In addition, we propose that framing of terrorists’ images as criminals vs. 
soldiers may be effective only when people’s ideological orientations correspond to the 
proposed frame.  
Framing of terrorists as criminals - unpredictable social deviants who threaten social 
order and security - is likely to appeal to people high in right wing authoritarianism concerned 
with maintaining predictable social order. Consequently, it may result in directing the 
responsibility for counterterrorism to institutions of criminal justice system only among those 
high in right wing authoritarianism. The actions that people who endorse high levels of right 
wing authoritarianism are likely to prefer will focus on regaining and maintaining internal 
security and control. Thus, people high in right wing authoritarianism perceiving terrorists as 
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criminals are likely to support the police pursuit of perpetrators of terrorist acts and the 
prosecution of terrorist suspects. Supporting these predictions, previous studies indicate that 
those high in right wing authoritarianism prefer counterterrorism that has to do with 
increasing internal control and surveillance (e.g. Cohrs, Moschner, Maes & Kielmann, 2005a; 
Cohrs, et al., 2005b; Crowson et al., 2006) and removing ‘suspicious’ people (e.g. immigrants 
from countries supporting terrorism) from the country (Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich & 
Morgan, 2006). However, to our knowledge, no studies have examined the role of right wing 
authoritarianism in eliciting support for criminal prosecution of terrorists, especially in 
response to framing terrorists as criminals (see Pronin et al., 2006)1.  
Framing of terrorist images as soldiers may appeal especially to people high in social 
dominance orientation concerned with intergroup power struggle. Their social world is based 
on such categories as force, influence, power and competition. Thus, people high in social 
dominance orientation are likely to attribute terrorists with characteristics typical for rivals in 
a group struggle over power and dominance. In response, they are likely to prefer coercive, 
group-based actions against terrorists. Thus, people high on social dominance orientation may 
prefer military counterterrorism that corresponds to the framing of the terrorists’ images as 
soldiers. Previous studies confirm that support for coercive counterterrorism among people 
high in social dominance orientation is associated with decreased concern for the human cost 
of war (McFarland et al., 2005). However, the moderating role of social dominance 
orientation on the relationship between terrorist image as enemy soldiers and support for 
military counterterrorism has not yet been tested. 
We test our hypotheses in a correlational study conducted in Poland (Study 1) and an 
experimental study conducted in the United Kingdom (Study 2). In Study 1 we assess 
individual ideological orientations and chronic tendencies to perceive terrorists as enemy 
soldiers or criminals. In Study 2 we assess individual ideological orientations and manipulate 
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the way the images of terrorists are framed. In both studies we examine the role of terrorist 
images and individual orientations in shaping preferences for counterterrorist responses.  
 
Study 1 
Study 1 examined the relationships between the endorsed terrorist images and support 
for different approaches to counterterrorism: military aggression vs. criminal prosecution. The 
study looked at how these relationships are moderated by right wing authoritarianism and 
social dominance orientation. The study controlled the role of political conservatism, typically 
associated with preference for coercive responses to intergroup threat (e.g. Holsti, 1990).  
 
Method 
 Participants and procedure.   
 The study was conducted among 298 Polish undergraduate students of whom 176 were 
females and 122 males. The mean age of participants was 24.36 (SD = 2.25). Participants 
were rewarded with research participation credit.  
Measures 
Social dominance orientation (α = .87; M = 3.01; SD = 1.08) was measured by a 10-
item version of the SDO Scale (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) pretested in previous studies (e.g. 
McFarland, 2005; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009).  
Right Wing Authoritarianism (α = .77; M = 3.75; SD = .90) was measured by a 10-
item version of the original RWA Scale proposed by Altemeyer (1988) pretested in previous 
studies (e.g. McFarland, 2005; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). 
Political conservatism was measured by one question: “Please describe your political 
outlook using the following scale:” and the scale from “1” = “very liberal” to “5” = “very 
conservative” (M = 3.87; SD = .98). 
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Al-Qaeda Terrorist Images were assessed by means of the Terrorist Image Scale 
(Kubik & Kossowska, 2007). In this scale participants are asked to assess the probability that 
a typical Al-Qaeda terrorist possesses each of the 26 characteristics. The participants respond 
using a scale ranging from 0% to 100%. The sub-scale assessing the image of terrorists as 
soldiers contains adjectives and phrases emphasizing the political goals of terrorists 
(organized, power hungry, focused on a political goal) and methods to achieve them (armed, 
publicity seeking) (α = .79; M=77; SD=12.01).  The sub-scale assessing the image of terrorists 
as criminals contains adjectives and phrases that stress the egocentric goals and cynical 
methods of individual terrorists. The traits ascribed to terrorists seen as criminals suggest 
emotional blindness and lack of human feelings: criminal, blood-thirsty and cruel (α = .69; 
M=80; SD=17.7)2. 
The Terrorist Image Scale was constructed to uncover people’s ‘private theories’ of 
who terrorists are and what they are like. The adjectives used to describe the Al-Qaeda 
terrorist emerged from content-analytic validation studies (Kubik & Kossowska, 2007; 
Kossowska, Golec de Zavala & Kubik, 2010a). First, a diverse group of participants was 
interviewed about their perceptions of Al-Qaeda terrorists. The interviews were content-
analyzed by 3 independent judges who classified the obtained descriptions into categories. A 
list of 31 adjectives and phrases was obtained and administered to a large group of 
participants in Poland (and a number of other countries such as Great Britain and Spain, 
Kossowska, et al., 2010a; Kossowska, et al., 2010b). Factor analyses examined the structure 
of cognitive representations of Al Qaeda terrorists. In Poland, they revealed a four-factor 
structure with orthogonal factors. The factors pertain to images of terrorists that can be 
interpreted as: (1) ideologues motivated by beliefs; (2) warriors using terrorist actions as a 
method of warfare; (3) criminals, blood thirsty lawbreakers, and (4) victims of the system: 
brain-washed or forced to unwanted violence by experienced oppression. The results in other 
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countries reliably revealed a two-factor structure. The factors can be interpreted as (1) 
strategically thinking warriors and (2) inhumane criminals (Kossowska et al., 2010b).  
Support for coercive counterterrorist actions was measured with 5 items adapted 
from Pronin and colleagues (2006). Participants were asked whether they agreed that each of 
the following was a good and effective strategy of dealing with terrorism. The items pertained 
to aggressive military actions e.g. “Air strikes against terrorist weapons and supply storage”; 
“Entering war with countries that support terrorism”; or “Attacks by ground troops against 
terrorist strongholds” (α = .79; M = 2.92; SD = .62). Participants indicated their opinions on a 
scale ranging from “1”= “totally disagree” to “6” = “totally agree”.  
Support for criminal prosecution was measured with 4 items adapted from Pronin and 
colleagues (2006) pertaining to the actions of the police and criminal justice system e.g. 
“Cooperation of police forces tracking terrorist organizations and their networks”; “Hunting 
down terrorist leaders by police” or “International cooperation among criminal courts in fast 
and tough sentencing of captured terrorists” (α = .90; M = 3.73; SD = 0.59). Participants 
indicated their opinions on a scale ranging from “1”= “totally disagree” to “6” = “totally 
agree”. 
Results 
The correlational analyses indicate that a tendency to perceive Al-Qaeda terrorists as 
soldiers is positively associated with a preference for military counterterrorism. It is positively 
associated with social dominance orientation, but not right wing authoritarianism. The image 
of Al-Qaeda terrorists as criminals is positively associated with a preference for criminal 
justice system actions in response to terrorism and right wing authoritarianism and negatively 
related to social dominance orientation. The two images of Al-Qaeda terrorists are not 
correlated. Political conservatism correlates positively with all measured variables (Table 1).  
TABLE 1 
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In order to test the hypothesis that military vs. criminal justice system based 
counterterrorism can be predicted from different perceptions of Al-Qaeda terrorists in 
interaction with different ideological orientations, we conducted 2 hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses. The model was first tested using support for military counterterrorism as 
the criterion variable. Next, support for criminal prosecution was used as the criterion 
variable. The images of Al-Qaeda terrorists as enemy soldiers and as criminals, right wing 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation were entered into the regression equation in 
Step 1. The hypothesized interactions of right wing authoritarianism and the terrorist image as 
criminals and social domination orientation and the image of terrorists as soldiers were 
entered in Step 23. Since previous studies and present correlations indicate that conservatism 
is related to right wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and coercive intergroup 
actions, its effect should be covaried out. Thus, political conservatism was entered into the 
equations as a control variable (together with age and gender). All variables were centered 
prior to the analysis, following the procedure proposed by Aiken and West (1991).  
The results of the analysis that used the support for coercive counterterrorism as the 
criterion variable revealed the significant, positive effects of social dominance orientation and 
the image of Al-Qaeda terrorists as soldiers. These single-order effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction of social dominance orientation and the perception of terrorists as 
enemy soldiers. Adding the interaction terms to the equation significantly increased the 
amount of explained variance (Table 2). 
TABLE 2 
This interaction was then probed using the procedure proposed by Aiken and West 
(1991). Social dominance orientation was positively and significantly related to support for 
military counterterrorism among participants who perceived terrorists as warriors (one 
standard deviation above the mean of the scale measuring the image of Al-Qaeda terrorists as 
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enemy soldiers, b =.27; SE =.05; β= .25; p<.01). Social dominance orientation was 
negatively related to support for military counterterrorism among participants who did not 
perceive Al-Qaeda terrorists as enemy soldiers (one standard deviation below the mean of the 
scale, b =-.25; SE =.07; β= -.19; p<.05) (Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1 
The results of the multiple regression analysis using the support for criminal 
prosecution as the criterion variable revealed significant, positive effects of right wing 
authoritarianism and perception of Al-Qaeda terrorists as criminals. These effects were 
qualified by a significant interaction of right wing authoritarianism and the perception of 
terrorists as criminals. Adding the interaction terms to the equation significantly increased the 
amount of explained variance (Table 3).  
TABLE 3 
The probing of this interaction indicated that right wing authoritarianism was 
positively related to support for criminal prosecution of terrorists among those participants 
who perceived terrorists as criminals (b =.23; SE =.07;β=.21;p<.01) and it was negatively 
related to it among participants who did not perceive terrorists as criminals (b =-.19; SE 
=.08;β= -.15;p=.06). This slope was marginally significant (Figure 2). 
FIGURE 2 
Discussion of Study 1 
 The results of Study 1 confirmed the expected pattern of results. They indicate that 
different images of Al-Qaeda terrorists are related to a preference for different approaches to 
counterterrorism. The preferred approaches correspond to the content of the terrorist images. 
People who see terrorists as enemy soldiers support coercive and warlike counterterrorism. 
People who see terrorists as criminals choose to delegate the responsibility for counterterrorist 
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actions to forces indicated for the chase, capture and prosecution of criminals. As predicted, 
those high in right wing authoritarianism, concerned with security and social order, prefer 
criminal prosecutions of terrorists. People high on social dominance orientation, concerned 
with intergroup power-struggle, prefer to fight the terrorists. Importantly, the relationships 
between terrorists’ images and approaches to counterterrorism were moderated by individual 
ideological orientations. The support for coercive counterterrorism was strongest among 
people high in social dominance orientation who viewed terrorists as enemy soldiers. The 
support for criminal prosecution was strongest among people high in right wing 
authoritarianism who saw Al-Qaeda terrorists as criminals. 
Social dominance orientation, but not right wing authoritarianism interacted with 
perception of terrorists as soldiers in predicting support for war on terrorism. Right wing 
authoritarianism but not social dominance orientation interacted with the perception of 
terrorists as criminals in predicting support for the criminal justice system in dealing with the 
terrorist threat. These results indicate that people high in right wing authoritarianism and 
people high in social dominance orientation are sensitive to different aspects of the terrorist 
threat. Different terrorist images mobilize them to form and express preferences for different 
approaches towards counterterrorism. 
Study 1 revealed that ideological orientations were related more than support for 
counterterrorism methods associated with the content of the terrorist images. They were also 
related to the opposition to those actions when participants did not endorse the corresponding 
terrorist image. People high in social dominance orientation tend to believe that terrorists are 
enemy soldiers and prefer to use military aggression against them. However, when they did 
not believe that Al-Qaeda terrorists were enemy soldiers, they opposed the use of coercive 
counterterrorism against them. This suggests that people high in social dominance orientation 
pick their fights carefully and strategically. They may prefer to mobilize resources and 
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aggress only against ‘worthy’ opponents. They may actively oppose investing resources and 
energy to engage with an opponent who is not perceived as a representative of an out-group or 
who is not seen as a serious threat to the in-group’s position.  
Similar results, although marginally significant, were found also among people high in 
right wing authoritarianism. They tended to perceive terrorists as criminals and preferred the 
criminal justice system to deal with them. However, when they disagreed that terrorists are 
criminals, they opposed criminal prosecution of terrorists. Together, the present results may 
suggest that ideological orientations are linked to well-defined ideas of what are effective 
ways of dealing with the threats vital to each orientation. These ways are to be applied in the 
face of such vital threats but they are not supposed to be used when the challenging problems 
are not classified as vital threats.  
The results of Study 1, however promising, left several issues unresolved. The 
correlational design of Study 1 does not allow us to draw a firm conclusion about the direction 
of causality in the hypothesized relationships. We assumed that the terrorist images would 
lead to a preference for relevant counterterrorist actions. This assumption is based on 
numerous studies which suggest that basic perceptions and broader ideological orientations 
constrain specific attitudes, such as support for intergroup actions (rather than vice versa; e.g. 
Cohrs, et al., 2005b; Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2006; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; 
Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin & Pratto, 1997). However, it is possible to imagine that the 
terrorist perceptions might serve as justification for preferred counterterrorist strategies that 
are, for example, related to individual ideological orientations. The negative relationship 
between social dominance orientation and a preference for military counterterrorism when 
terrorists are not perceived as soldiers, and the marginally significant and negative association 
between right wing authoritarianism and a preference for criminal justice system actions 
already speak against this possibility. However, in order to be able to demonstrate 
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convincingly that people who endorse high levels of right wing authoritarianism and people 
high in social dominance react differently to different terrorist images, we conducted a 
second, experimental study.  
 
Study 2 
Study 2 tested the hypothesis that when terrorists are framed as warriors, participants 
would be more likely to prefer coercive, military counterterrorism than when terrorists are 
framed as criminals, especially when they are high in social dominance orientation. It was 
also expected that when the terrorists are framed as criminals, the preferred approach to 
counterterrorism would be of control and detainment, especially among those high in right 
wing authoritarianism. Thus, Study 2 tested the proposition that people high in right wing 
authoritarianism and people high in social dominance orientation selectively find different 
terrorist frames appealing. Different terrorist images inspire them to choose corresponding 
counterterrorist actions. 
Method  
Participants and procedure 
 The study was conducted among 220 British undergraduate students who participated 
in exchange for research participation credit. There were 152 women and 68 men among the 
participants and the mean age was 24.15 (SD = 6.37). One hundred and twelve participants 
defined their religion as Christian; 21 identified themselves as Muslim; 40 described 
themselves as non-religious; 7 as Hindu; 3 as Buddhists and 3 as Jewish. One hundred 
participants defined their ethnicity as White; 67 as Black; 25 as Arab; 20 as Asian and 10 
participants did not provide data about their ethnicity.  
The data from participants who identified their religion as Islam or their ethnicity as 
Arab were removed from further analyses (n = 27). Since the study was designed around the 
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London Bombings of 7th of July 2005 perpetrated by Arab Muslims, we assumed that the 
religious identity of Muslim participants might influence their responses. The analyses were 
performed on the reduced sample of 193 participants, 133 female and 60 male. Mean age was 
24.25 (SD = 6.44). 
Participants were asked to take part in a study on opinions about the terrorist threat and 
counterterrorism policy in Britain. They first responded to the demographic questions, the 
Conservative-Liberal Self-Placement Scale, SDO (Pratto et al., 1994) and RWA Scales 
(Altemeyer, 1996). Then they read a mock newspaper article on terrorist threat and 
counterterrorism strategies that contained the experimental manipulation, and they responded 
to a measure of preference for counterterrorist actions. Ninety five participants were asked to 
respond to an additional measure checking the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation. 
The manipulation check analyses were performed on a sample of 77 participants after the data 
obtained from Muslim participants were removed.  
Experimental manipulation 
 In order to frame the image of terrorists as soldiers or criminals, we used a mock 
newspaper article that contained an alleged speech by the then Mayor of London after the 
terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda in London in July 2005. In the criminal image 
condition (n = 99) the participants read the following fragment: “Terrorist bombing is an 
indiscriminate attempt at mass murder. Terrorists are organized criminals, deviants from 
their own society. It is not just an attempt to slaughter people, irrespective of any 
considerations for age, for class, for religion, or whatever. It is an attack of the social order 
of free, inclusive and civil society”. In the soldier image condition (n = 94) participants read 
the following fragment:“Terrorist bombing is an unprovoked act of war. Terrorists are the 
soldiers of the enemy fighting for the goals of their group. It is not just an attempt to slaughter 
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people, irrespective of any considerations for age, for class, for religion, or whatever. It is an 
attack of the idea of free, inclusive and civil society”. 
Measures 
The same measures of social dominance orientation (α = .74; M = 2.76; SD = .88); 
right wing authoritarianism (α = .62; M= 3.52; SD = .76) and political conservatism (M= 2.62; 
SD = .83) as in Study 1 were used. Participants indicated their support for military 
counterterrorism (α = .79; M = 3.28; SD = 1.13) and the efforts of police forces and criminal 
justice systems in capturing and prosecuting terrorists (α = .90; M = 4.69; SD = 1.24) as in 
Study 1. 
Manipulation check questions were asked in each condition. Perception of terrorists 
as soldiers was measured by 2 items: “Terrorists are soldiers” and “Terrorists are fighters 
for the cause” (α = .53; M = 4.13; SD = 1.12). Perception of terrorists as criminals was 
assessed by 2 items: “Each and every terrorist is a criminal” and “Terrorists are cold-
blooded and cunning lawbreakers” (α = .67; M = 4.19; SD = 1.18). Participants were asked to 
provide their answers on a scale from “1” = “totally disagree” to “6” = “totally agree”.  
Results 
Mean responses to the questions measuring the perception of terrorists as enemy 
soldiers revealed that participants scored significantly higher on this measure in the research 
conditions in which the terrorists were framed as soldiers (M = 4.52; SD = 1.25) than in the 
conditions in which the terrorists were framed as criminals (M = 3.95; SD = 1.29; F (1,76) = 
4.40; p<.04). Similarly, in the research conditions in which terrorists were framed as criminals 
participants agreed more with the statements that terrorists are criminals (M = 4.45; SD = 
1.22) than in the research conditions in which the terrorists were framed as enemy soldiers (M 
= 3.95; SD = 1.11; F (1,75) = 3.48; p<.05). There were no interactive effects of social 
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dominance orientation or right wing authoritarianism and conditions of either of the 
manipulation check measures. 
Correlational analyses revealed that across the research conditions political 
conservatism was significantly associated with preference for coercive counterterrorism (r 
(192) =.31; p< .01). The relationship between preference for coercive counterterrorism and 
social dominance orientation was marginally significant (r (192) = .14; p = .09). Preference 
for criminal prosecution of terrorists was positively associated with right wing 
authoritarianism. This relationship was marginally significant (r (192) = .11; p = .10).  
Political conservatism was included in further analyses as a control variable.  
In order to test the hypothesis that framing terrorists as soldiers will result in the 
choice of military counterterrorism, especially among people high in social dominance 
orientation, and the hypothesis that framing terrorists as criminals will result in preference for 
criminal prosecution of terrorists, especially among people high in right wing 
authoritarianism, we conducted a series of 2 hierarchical multiple regression analyses 
following the procedure proposed by Cohen et al. (2003).  
All continuous variables were centered prior to analysis. Research conditions (dummy 
coded -1 –criminal/1 - soldier), right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation 
were entered into the regression equation in Step 1. Two interaction terms - right wing 
authoritarianism x research conditions and social dominance x research conditions were 
entered in Step 2. The analyses controlled for age, gender and political conservatism4. 
The results of the regression analysis that looked at support for coercive 
counterterrorist actions as the criterion variable revealed significant, positive single-order 
effects of age and political conservatism, and a significant interaction effect between social 
dominance orientation and research conditions5. Adding the interaction terms to the regression 
equation significantly increased the explained variance (Table 4).  
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TABLE 4 
The simple slopes were computed for the conditions in which terrorists were framed as 
criminals and for the conditions in which terrorists were framed as soldiers according to the 
procedure proposed by Cohen et al. (2003). The results indicate that, when the terrorists were 
framed as enemy soldiers, people high in social dominance orientation supported the military 
counterterrorism (b = .27; SE = .12; β = .15; p< .02). They rejected it when the terrorists were 
framed as criminals (b =-.26; SE = .11; β = -.18; p < .01) (Figure 3).  
FIGURE 3 
The results of the analysis that examined support for criminal prosecution as the 
criterion variable revealed a marginally significant, positive, single order effect of right wing 
authoritarianism, while the second step revealed a significant interaction between right wing 
authoritarianism and research conditions, and a significant interaction between social 
dominance orientation and research conditions. Adding the interaction terms to the regression 
equation significantly increased the explained variance (Table 5).  
TABLE 5 
The results of simple slopes analyses probing the interactions showed that only when 
the image of the terrorists was framed as criminals did people who endorsed high levels of 
right wing authoritarianism support criminal prosecution of the suspected terrorists (b =.32;  
SE = .14; β = .23; p< .02). When terrorists were framed as soldiers, the relationship between 
right wing authoritarianism and preference for criminal prosecution of terrorists was not 
significant (b = -.01; SE = .16; β = .23; p = .80) (Figure 4). 
FIGURE 4 
When terrorists were framed as criminals, the relationship between social dominance 
orientation and support for criminal prosecution was negative and significant (b =-.38; SE = 
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.14; β = .24; p< .01). When the terrorists were framed as soldiers, the relationship was not 
significant (b = .18; SE = .17; β = .09; p = .28) (Figure 5).  
FIGURE 5 
Discussion of Study 2 
 The results of Study 2 replicate, in an experimental context, the interactive effects 
found in the Study 1. The effects of framing terrorists as soldiers vs. criminals on preferences 
for corresponding approaches towards counterterrorism were moderated by individual 
ideological orientations. Framing of the terrorist images in itself did not affect preferences for 
corresponding counterterrorist actions. However, when terrorists were framed as criminals, 
people who endorsed high levels of right wing authoritarianism preferred criminal prosecution 
of terrorists. When terrorists were framed as enemy soldiers, people high on social dominance 
orientation preferred military counterterrorism. 
The additional, unexpected results deepen our understanding of the role of social 
dominance orientation as a moderator of the relationship between terrorist images and 
preference for counterterrorist measures. People high in social dominance orientation opposed 
aggressive counterterrorism when terrorists were framed as criminals. These results 
corroborate the findings of Study 1 indicating that people high in social dominance orientation 
oppose coercive counterterrorism when they do not believe that terrorists are enemy soldiers. 
In addition, in Study 2 the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for 
criminal prosecution of terrorists was negative and became significant when the terrorists 
were framed as criminals. Framing terrorists as criminals seem to have meant different things 
to people high in right wing authoritarianism and people high in social dominance orientation. 
In order to better understand these results we examined the effects of research 
conditions, ideological orientations and their interactions on each of the manipulation check 
questions regarding perception of terrorists. This allowed for more in-depth analysis of 
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whether social dominance orientation affected terrorist perceptions after the framing of 
terrorist images. The analysis revealed a marginally significant interaction effect of social 
dominance orientation and research conditions (apart from the main effect of research 
conditions) on agreement with the statement “Each and every terrorist is a criminal” (b = 
.27;  SE = .19; β = .15; p = .11). The simple slopes analyses indicate that people high in social 
dominance orientation disagreed with this statement particularly when terrorists were framed 
as criminals (b =-.61; SE = .31; β = -.28; p = .06 vs. when they were framed as soldiers, b 
=.01; SE = .22; β = .01; p= .98). These results may indicate that people high in social 
dominance orientation find the framing of terrorists as criminals unconvincing. Especially 
when such a framing is proposed, they tend to disagree and refuse to support the 
counterterrorist actions that this framing implies.  
General Discussion 
Studies presented in this paper aimed to advance our understanding of the role of 
terrorist images in shaping people’s preferences for different counterterrorism approaches. 
More specifically, the studies looked at predictors of the preference for coercive, military 
counterterrorism vs. criminal prosecution of terrorists. Two studies were conducted in two 
European countries using correlational and experimental designs. Their findings converge to 
indicate that preference for counterterrorist actions is shaped by the way terrorists are 
perceived or portrayed and the extent to which the terrorist image fits the worldviews, values 
and fears underlying individual ideological orientations. 
The results of Study 1 revealed the correspondence between the content of the terrorist 
image and the counterterrorist actions people deem most effective and suitable. When 
terrorists are perceived as warriors, war is seen as the most adequate response to terrorist 
threat. When terrorists are perceived as criminals, criminal prosecution is seen as the most 
desirable counterterrorist response. To our knowledge, these are the first studies empirically to 
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demonstrate this relationship hypothesized by other authors (e.g. McCauley, 2007). At the 
same time, the results of Study 2 indicate that the framing of terrorist images (as opposed to 
endorsing them) does not in itself result in preference for corresponding counterterrorist 
actions. Framing the terrorist image is followed by the expression of preference for the 
corresponding approach to counterterrorism only when it matches peoples’ worldviews, and 
appeals to the basic goals and motivations that shape their ideological orientations. A given 
way of painting the terrorist image results in a preference for corresponding counterterrorist 
actions only when it makes sense to people. 
Specifically, the results of Study 1 indicate that the relationship between support for 
coercive counterterrorism and the perception of terrorists as soldiers is strengthened among 
people high in social dominance orientation. People high in social dominance orientation tend 
to support military actions against terrorists more when they believe the terrorists are enemy 
soldiers. People who endorse high levels of right wing authoritarianism support criminal 
prosecution of terrorists more when they believe that terrorists are criminals. The relationship 
between the image of terrorists as criminals and a preference for criminal prosecution of 
terrorists is strengthened among people high in right wing authoritarianism. Study 2 indicates 
that when the terrorists are framed as criminals, only those high in right wing authoritarianism 
support criminal prosecution of terrorists. Framing terrorists as soldiers increases support for 
aggressive counterterrorism only among people high in social dominance orientation. Thus, 
framing of the terrorist image is effective only when people are predisposed to believe in it 
because it is consistent with the image they already hold or it makes sense within their 
understanding of the social world. In addition, as suggested by the present research, people 
may even be predisposed to object to the framing of the terrorist image that does not concur 
with their worldviews and their understanding of the social world.  
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In this vein, the present studies yield several unexpected findings which advance our 
understanding of the way ideological orientations and terrorist images interact. Firstly, the 
present studies suggest that ideological orientations, especially social dominance orientation, 
enhance the precision and firmness of the correspondence between terrorist images and 
counterterrorist actions. Study 1 revealed that people high in social dominance orientation 
preferred military aggression only when they saw terrorists as enemy soldiers. When they 
disagreed that terrorists were enemy soldiers, they opposed the use of military aggression 
against them6.  
It seems that people high in social dominance orientation support aggression against a 
group that threatens the in-group’s intergroup position but oppose mobilization of resources 
against a group that does not. There are reasons to believe that people high in social 
dominance orientation prefer to see terrorists as representatives of a group rather than as 
individual deviants. In Study 1, people high in social dominance orientation did not endorse 
the image of terrorists as individual criminals but believed they were enemy soldiers. In Study 
2 they tended to reject the belief that each and every terrorist is a criminal when prompted to 
think about terrorists as criminals. Arguably, people high in social dominance orientation 
opposed the criminal prosecution of terrorists as an effective way of dealing with terrorist 
threat because they did not believe terrorists are ‘only’ individuals who commit criminal acts. 
Therefore, they should not be approached as other criminals.  
The present findings advance our understanding of how preferences for 
counterterrorism approaches are shaped. However, they are also relevant beyond the situation 
of terrorist threat. Any intergroup tensions are likely to escalate when extremists in one group 
are seen as being typical representatives of that group, rather than as deviants (e.g. Deutsch, 
1973).  Such a perception may be ‘advertised’ by the media, politicians and other opinion-
makers (McCauley, 2007). The present studies indicate that it may first appeal to people to 
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whose ideological orientations it corresponds. More specifically, it is likely to convince and 
mobilize the support of people high in social dominance orientation. People who endorse high 
levels of right wing authoritarianism prefer to see extremists as individual deviants. However, 
they do not oppose the framing of terrorists as enemy soldiers. The more the perception of 
hostile extremists as typical out-group representatives is endorsed, the more the worldviews, 
values and fears underlying social dominance orientation may become representative and 
defining for the whole in-group’s ‘ideological climate’ (e.g. Farer, 2008). Goals of intergroup 
dominance are likely to overbalance the goals of intergroup harmony, the value of the 
sacrifice in the name of the group may become more important than the value of individual 
life. The group is then more likely to engage in hostile intergroup actions and escalate 
intergroup tensions.   
Aggressive, military actions and criminal justice system actions in response to 
terrorist threat are not mutually exclusive and are often enacted at the same time. 
However, the criminal prosecution of terrorists, as opposed to engaging in a war, does 
not require mobilization of social support and a long-lasting shift in the in-group’s 
values and out-group perception. Such a shift is likely to contribute to escalation and 
persistence of the intergroup tensions that resulted in terrorist actions in the first place. 
The present results suggest that attempts to persuade people who tend to support 
intergroup hostility that the out-group extremists are individual deviants from the out-
group’s norms, rather than its typical out-group representatives, are not likely to be 
successful. In Study 2 people high in social dominance orientation seemed to oppose 
the framing of terrorists as individual criminals, potentially less harmful to intergroup 
relations. This indicates that, among people high in social dominance orientation, the 
perception of extremists as group representatives, once it is formed, may be 
particularly difficult to change. The present research offers a suggestion of a way in 
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which the ‘disarming’ of the propensity for hostile intergroup responses among people 
high in social dominance orientation may be attempted. Framing of the out-group as 
unworthy opponents may lead to rejection of aggressive group-based responses. This 
possibility, however, was not directly addressed in the present research and it requires 
further examination. Future studies should also further examine the intriguing 
possibility that has emerged from the present research that ideological orientations 
correspond not only to endorsement but also to a rejection of certain terrorist images. 
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Endnotes 
1.Studies show that right wing authoritarianism is related to support for aggressive 
counterterrorism. However, it is likely that the motivation behind support for such actions is 
the following of the call of the established authorities (e.g. McFarland, 2005). 
2. In Study 1 we were primarily interested in these two terrorist images. However, studies 
indicate that four distinct terrorist images can be differentiated in Poland. Thus, in Study 1 we 
measured all images and performed additional multiple regression analyses looking at all 
terrorist images and their interactions with right wing authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation. These analyses yield no other significant results and they did not change the 
pattern of the reported results. 
3. Additional hierarchical multiple regression analyses were performed that included all 
possible two way interactions of the four main predictors in Step 2 to exclude the possibility 
that the predicted interactions are affected by intercorrelations between right wing 
authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and other possible interactions between the 
ideological orientations and the two images. These analyses do not reveal any other 
significant results and do not change the pattern of the results. We also performed a series of 
analyses treating political conservatism as the predictor rather than the control variable, and 
tested the interactive effects of terrorists’ perceptions and political conservatism. These 
analyses did not yield any additional significant results. Finally, because the two approaches 
to counterterrorism were positively correlated, we performed analyses entering the 
counterterrorist approach that was not the criterion variable as a control variable. The pattern 
of results did not change. 
4. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis that included all possible two way interactions 
of the three main predictors in Step 2 and three-way interaction in Step 3 was also performed.  
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It did not reveal any other significant results and did not change the pattern of the presented 
results. 
5. Additional multiple regression analyses were run adding the interaction between political 
conservatism and research conditions in Step 2 and all three way interactions of ideological 
variables and research conditions in Step 3. No other significant interaction was found and the 
presented pattern of results reminded unchanged. 
6. To some extent similar was true for people who endorsed high levels of right wing 
authoritarianism who opposed criminal prosecution of terrorists when they did not agree that 
terrorists were criminals, although this result was marginally significant. 
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Table 1. Correlations between terrorist images, preferences for military vs. criminal justice 
approach to counterterrorism, right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation: 
Study 1 (N = 298). 
 
 RWA SDO criminal 
prosecution 
aggressive 
counter 
terrorism 
terrorists 
as 
criminals 
terrorists 
as 
soldiers 
Conservatism     .28**     .23* .27**  .32***   .20* .26** 
terrorists as 
soldiers 
    .10     .19*    -.09 .27** .13 ------ 
terrorists as 
criminals 
.30***     .08 .25**      .18* ------ ------ 
aggressive 
counterterrorism 
.25** 28**     .21* ------ ------ ------ 
criminal 
prosecution 
.28**    -.23*     ------ ------ ------ ------ 
SDO     .09    ------     ------ ------ ------ ------ 
Note: *p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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Table 2. 
Multiple regression analysis of terrorist images, social dominance orientation and right wing 
authoritarianism on support for aggressive counterterrorism (no significant effect of age, 
gender or political conservatism): Study 1 (N = 298). 
Variable B SE B Βeta 
Step1    
Terrorists as soldiers    .19** .06 .19 
Terrorists as criminals .11   .10 .09 
SDO       .22*** .05 .22 
RWA     .20** .08 .19 
 
Step 2 
   
   Terrorists as soldiers     .19** .06 .19 
   Terrorists as criminals .10 .11 .09 
   SDO     .22** .05 .22 
   RWA .15 .10 .11 
   SDO X terrorists as soldiers .14* .07 .15 
   RWA X terrorists as criminals .09 .12 .07 
Note.  
F(1, 297) = 1,64; p = .19;R2 = .14 for Step 1;  
F(2, 296) =  2.77; p< .05; ∆R2 = .02 for Step 2 (p < .05)   
∆R2(2, 297) =.02; p< .05 
 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p< .001. 
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Table 3. 
Multiple regression analysis of terrorists images, social dominance orientation and right wing 
authoritarianism on support for criminal prosecution of terrorists (no significant effect of age, 
gender or political conservatism): Study 1 (N = 298). 
Variable B SE B Βeta 
Step1    
   Terrorists as soldiers .03 .06 .03 
   Terrorists as criminals .25*** .05 .25 
   SDO               -.09 .06               -.09 
   RWA .23*** .06 .23 
 
Step 2 
   
   Terrorists as soldiers .03 .06 .03 
   Terrorists as criminals       .25***   .05 .25 
   SDO               -.09 .06               -.09 
   RWA      .18** .05 .15 
   SDO X terrorists as soldiers -.10 .07               -.09 
   RWA X terrorists as criminals .18** .05 .15 
Note.  
F(1, 297) = 1.22; p = .25 R2 = .16 for Step 1;  
F(2, 296) = 2.46; p< .05; ∆R2 = .02 for Step 2 (p < .02)   
∆R2(2, 297) = .02; p< .01 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p< .001. 
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Table 4. 
Multiple regression analysis of the framing of the terrorist image, social dominance 
orientation and right wing authoritarianism on support for aggressive counterterrorism (no 
significant effect of gender): Study 2 (N = 193). 
Variable B SE B Βeta 
Step1    
   Age -.04** .01 -.21 
   Political conservatism .39*** .08 .34 
   Image framing -.07 .08 -.06 
   SDO -.05 .08 -.04 
   RWA .01 .08 .01 
 
Step 2 
   
   Age  -.04** .01 -.25 
   Political conservatism .39*** .08 .35 
   Image framing -.07 .08 -.06 
   SDO .004 .08 .003 
   RWA -.003 .02 -.002 
   SDO X image framing .27** .04 .24 
   RWA X image framing -.12 .08 -.11 
Note.  
F (6, 178) = 6.06; p < .001; R2 = .169 for Step 1;  
F (8, 176) = 6.11; p< .001; ∆R2 = .05 for Step 2 (p < .005)   
∆ R2 (2,176) = .05; p< .01 
**p < .001. ***p< .000. 
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Table 5. 
Multiple regression analysis of the framing of the terrorist image, social dominance 
orientation and right wing authoritarianism on support for criminal prosecution of terrorists 
(no significant effect of age, gender or political conservatism): Study 2 (N = 193). 
Variable B SE B Βeta 
Step1    
   Image framing -.03 .09 -.02 
   SDO -.16 .10 -.13 
   RWA .17+ .10 .13 
 
Step 2 
   
   Image framing -.03 .09 -.02 
   SDO -.11 .10 -.08 
   RWA .13 .10 .11 
   SDO X image framing .28** .10 .23 
   RWA X image framing -.18* .11 -.15 
Note.  
F(6, 178) = 1.32; p = .25 R2 = .043 for Step 1; 
F(8, 176) =  2.11; p< .02; ∆R2 = .05 for Step 2 (p < .02)   
∆ R2 (2,176) = .05; p< .02 
+ p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p< .001. 
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Figure 1: Interaction of the terrorists’ image as soldiers and social dominance orientation on 
preference for aggressive counterterrorism (Study 1:  N =298). 
Figure 2. Interaction of the terrorists’ image as criminals and right wing authoritarianism on 
preference for criminal prosecution of terrorists (Study 1:  N =298). 
Figure 3: Interaction of the terrorists’ image as soldiers and social dominance orientation on 
preference for aggressive counterterrorism (Study 2:  N = 193). 
Figure 4: Interaction of terrorists’ image as criminals and right wing authoritarianism on 
preference for criminal prosecution of terrorists (Study 2:  N = 193). 
Figure 5: Interaction of terrorists’ image as criminals and social dominance orientation on 
preference for criminal prosecution of terrorists (Study 2:  N = 193). 
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